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Don't Be Cowed
by Scientific
Evidence
A pretrial primer for prosecutors
and defense attorneys
BY F. THOMAS SCHORNHORST
ttorneys across the
country are finding
novel ways of using
ii.scientific evidence in
L 7 criminal trials. In Seat-
tie, prosecutors are gearing up to
present evidence of a DNA "finger-
print" they claim will establish the
source of semen recovered from a
rape victim who, because of Alz-
heimer's disease, is unable to iden-
tify her assailant. The scientific
premise is that deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA)-a basic component of
human genetic structure which can
be isolated from small samples of
tissue, blood or semen-is, like the
ridges, whorls and loops of one's
fingertips, individually unique. See
generally, 31 J. Forensic Sci. 393, 403,
409 (1986).
In a recent Florida case, a child
abuse conviction of a mother was,
in part, supported by the introduc-
tion of a "psychological autopsy"
which associated her daughter's su-
icide with the mother's mistreat-
ment. Nat. L.J., Nov. 16, 1987, p.10;
Jobes et al., "The Impact of Psycho-
logical Autopsies on Medical Ex-
aminers' Determination of Manner
of Death," 31 J. Forensic Sci. 177(1986).
Psychological "syndrome" evi-
dence is also being used by prose-
cutors with mixed success to
establish lack of consent in rape
cases (Rape Trauma Syndrome), or
to prove sexual or physical abuse of
young children (Child Sex Abuse
Syndrome, Battered Child Syn-
drome). See, e.g., State v. Black, 42
Crim. L. Rptr. 2122 (Wash. 1987)
(not admitted); McCord, "The Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony Re-
garding Rape Trauma Syndrome in
Rape Prosecutions," 26 B.C.L. Rev.
1143 (1985); McCord, "Syndromes,
Profiles and Other Mental Exotica:
A New Approach to the Admissibil-
ity of Non-Traditional Psychological
Evidence in Criminal Cases," 66 Ore.
L. Rev. 19 (1987); Comment, 34
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 175 (1986).
Defense counsel have joined the
forensic psychology fray by offering
evidence of Battered Wife Syn-
drome or Post Traumatic Stress Dis-
order in efforts to excuse or mitigate
serious criminal offenses (see cases
cited in McCord, supra at 1182-83)
and submitting, through experts, an
array of psychological studies which
cast doubt upon the accuracy of the
perceptions and memories of eye-
witnesses. See e.g., Wells and Lof-
tus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984);
Cutler et al., "The Reliability of Eye-
witness Identification: The Role of
System and Estimator Variables," 11
Law and Hum. Behav. 233 (1987).
These examples illustrate the
kinds of scientific evidence that
lawyers and judges may confront in
criminal cases. It takes significant
time and resources when develop-
ing, presenting and evaluating evi-
dence of this sort. While these ex-
amples present relatively novel and
controversial scientific theories and
techniques, even the generally ac-
cepted types of courtroom evi-
dence premised upon principles of
physical and behavioral science-
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fingerprints, hair and fiber compari-
sons, blood typing, firearms identifi-
cation, forensic pathology, chemical
substance identifications, mental
health evaluations-are changing
with the development of more so-
phisticated and discriminating test-
ing techniques and instrumentation.
Despite these developments it is
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probably true that
[l]awyers as a group evidence an
appalling degree of scientific illit-
eracy, which ill equips them to
educate and guide the bench in
its decisions on admissibility of
evidence proffered through ex-
pert witnesses. This scientific illit-
eracy is shared by a large segment
of the trial and appellate bench;
many judges simply do not un-
derstand evidence based on sci-
entific principles; even more
tragically, they overlook impor-
tant attributes indicative of relia-
bility of evidence they reject,
while ascribing positive proper-
ties to other evidence they ac-
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cept which that evidence simply
does not possess.
Moenssens, Inbau and Starrs, Sci-
entific Evidence in Criminal Cases 7
(3d ed. 1986).
Every prosecutor, defender, and
judge, however, can become "lit-
erate" about the scientific issues that
influence results in an ever growing
number of criminal cases.
The basics
The legal issues developed
through scientific evidence and ex-
pert testimony are basic. What was
the cause (or instrument) of death
or injury? How may the evidence be
associated with the defendant?
What is the nature of a substance
(blood, soil, semen, fibers, hair), and
how may the substance be associ-
ated with the defendant or a victim?
Was a projectile fired by a particular
or a certain type of firearm? In short,
evidence we call "scientific" is a
subcategory of circumstantial evi-
dence from which inferences of rel-
evant facts may be drawn.
There are several basic steps that
counsel must take to investigate and
prepare a case in which scientific
evidence and expert witnesses will
be tendered. In criminal cases the
prosecution usually will be the pro-
ponent of evidence. The state has
the burden of proof and has vir-
tually exclusive access to state, local
and FBI crime laboratory facilities.
The defendant most often is in the
unfavorable position of having to
counter the force of impressive tes-
timony by prosecution experts and,
with rare exceptions, will lack the
financial resources to retain expert
witnesses. Moenssens, Inbau and
Starrs, supra at 13-16.
The suggestions that follow are
intended as guidelines for counsel
preparing for a trial in which scien-
tific and expert evidence is likely to
be encountered. While the discus-
sion will be cast from one adversar-
ial perspective or another, most of
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the material will be relevant to both
prosecution and defense.
Thorough pretrial investigation
will alert counsel to issues upon
which scientific evidence and ex-
pert testimony will be useful and
even indispensable. Before a pros-
ecutor enters the case, the investi-
gating police agency will have
collected evidence at the crime
scene and elsewhere which, by the
time the case is presented to the
prosecutor, also may have been as-
sociated with a suspect or the vic-
tim. For example, the police will
have collected blood, hair, fiber and
other "trace" evidence from the
victim and perhaps even the sus-
pect. In homicide cases a medical
examiner will have conducted an
autopsy and filed a report describ-
ing the nature and extent of the vic-
tim's wounds, the cause of death,
and the recovery of bullet frag-
ments or other foreign material that
may have been transferred during
violent contact. The list of possibil-
ities depends upon the type of crime
and the nature of the investigation.
A prosecutor's early intervention
is critical. Trace evidence may exist
in minute quantities and will be
handled by a number of different
persons during the investigation and
analytical stages of the case. Main-
taining proper records of "chain of
custody" is critical to admissibility
at trial. Imwinkelried, The Methods
of Attacking Scientific Evidence 79-
104, 261-77 (1982).
The prosecutor must be aware of
the limitations of local forensic lab-
oratories' expertise and equipment,
and must anticipate defense chal-
lenges in the nature of "Why was
this or that test or procedure not
performed to confirm your results
and your opinion, etc." For exam-
ple, it has been contended that "or-
ganic" cocaine derived from the
coca plant (I-cocaine) is pharmaco-
logically distinct from its "mirror im-
age" or enantiomer (d-cocaine)
which can be produced syntheti-
cally. If the relevant controlled sub-
stances ("Coca leaves and any salt,
compound, or preparations of Coca
leaves..."), opposing counsel may
contend that the chemical tests per-
formed upon the suspect sub-
stance, no matter how specific for
other drugs, have not isolated the
substance as I-cocaine. Kurzman
and Fullerton, "Drug Identifica-
tion," in Imwinkelried (ed.), Scien-
tific and Expert Evidence 521, 548-53
(2d ed. 1981). These authors (citing
other authorities) contend that the
only way in which I-cocaine can be
distinguished positively from d-co-
caine is through the use of a "po-
larimeter (which shines plane
polarized light through the sample
and measures its optical rotation) or
by nuclear magnetic resonance us-
ing a chiral lanthanide shift re-
agent." Id. at 550-51. The failure of
the government's chemist to per-
form either of these confirmatory
tests may create a reasonable doubt
about substance identification.
Once the scientific issues are
identified, get "up to speed" in the
subject by reading the available lit-
erature. There are a number of pub-
lications that will provide the
informational background requisite
to the competent handling of sci-
entific issues in criminal cases, and
which will help the lawyer identify
the kinds of witness expertise that
will be required for the case. With-
out question this will require hours
of hard work in seemingly alien ter-
ritory.
There are some excellent basic
texts written for lawyers which pro-
vide good starting points for re-
search into the types of scientific
evidence likely to be encountered
in criminal trials. The most up-to-
date of these texts are Moenssens,
Inbau and Starrs, Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases (3d ed. 1986), and
Giannelli and Imwinkelried, Scien-
tific Evidence (1986). For another
entry into the field containing arti-
cles on basic subjects by a variety of
authors, see Wecht (ed.), Forensic
Science (a three-volume work re-
cently published by Matthew Bend-
er).
Another useful source is the col-
lection of articles edited by Profes-
sor Edward Irmwinkelried, Scientific
and Expert Evidence (2d ed. 1981).
lmwinkelried, one of the most pro-
lific academic writers in the field,
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also has produced a helpful work
called The Methods of Attacking Sci-
entific Evidence (1982). As the title
indicates, the book provides prac-
tical suggestions about how and
when to raise questions of admissi-
bility, and proposes arguments and
tactics adapted to attacks upon the
weight of the evidence. Despite its
title, the book is of great utility to
the proponents of scientific evi-
dence as well-forewarned is fore-
armed. See also Imwinkelried,
Giannelli, Gilligan and Lederer,
Courtroom Criminal Evidence, ch. 6,
pp. 113-88.
Departing from the legal litera-
ture, the single most useful source
of "state-of-the-art" information is
the Journal of Forensic Sciences, a
publication of the American Acad-
emy of Forensic Sciences. This pub-
lication, which prints the scholarly
work of academic and other foren-
sic science specialists, is a gold mine
for the trial lawyer, and provides a
source of fascinating, and some-
times entertaining, reading. Thumb-
ing at random through the 1986
collection, one finds the articles re-
porting the developments in re-
combinant DNA technology and its
potential courtroom applications
mentioned in the opening para-
graph of this article, along with a
case report of Homicidal Asphyxia by
Pepper Aspiration (vol. 31, p. 1470),
and a two part article by Professor
James E. Starrs, "Once More into the
Breech: The Firearms Evidence in the
Sacco Vanzetti Case Revisited" (vol.
31, pp. 630, 1050). With regard to
statistical, psychological and socio-
logical issues, helpful articles can be
found in the periodical Law and Hu-
man Behavior.
In addition, whenever scientific
information is important to a case,
counsel should make every effort to
consult the original works on the
relevant theories, experiments or
testing procedures. It is not uncom-
mon for mistaken interpretations or
conclusions to be reported as "fact"
in second- and third-hand accounts
of the original work. Neither is it un-
common at trial to discover that an
opponent's expert witness has re-
lied upon secondary and tertiary
sources in formulating his opinion.
The opportunity to "zing" the wit-
ness with the original source should
not be overlooked. See, e.g., Tread-
way and McCloskey, "Cite Unseen:
Distortions of the AlIport and Post-
man Rumor Study in the Eyewitness
Testimony Literature," 11 Law and
Hum. Behav. 19 (1987). Reading the
original source may also provide
ideas to counter the theory, as will
other articles or letters which take
issue with the research.
Experts qualified to render opin-
ions on one subject often are asked
to hold forth on subjects about
which they know very little. As "ex-
perts" they may be unwilling to ad-
mit that there is something related
to their specialties that they do not
know. Starrs, "In the Land of Agog:
An Allegory for the Expert Wit-
ness," 30 1. Forensic Sci. 289 (1985).
Properly prepared and scientifically
"literate" trial counsel either will
avoid this impropriety or be ready
to take advantage of an opponent's
attempt to smuggle a bogus expert
opinion into the record.
Evidentiary standards
All preparation must be done in
contemplation of the jurisdiction's
standard for admission of scientific
evidence. Jurisdictions throughout
the country generally share the
foundational criteria for the admis-
sion of expert opinion evidence as
embodied in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The proponent first must
establish logical relevance by show-
ing its "tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the
action more probable or less prob-
able than it would be without the
evidence." FRE 401. Then, "[i]f sci-
entific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue," a
properly qualified expert may give
testimony "in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise." FRE 702. The ap-
plication of this rule is subject to the
general limitations of FRE 403 which
recognizes the trial court's discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence "if
its probative value is substantially
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outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay. ... ." See
generally Carlson, "Policing the Bas-
es of Modern Expert Testimony," 39
Vand. L. Rev. 577 (1986).
While these criteria are viewed by
many evidence scholars as ade-
quate safeguards against the misuse
of forensic evidence (see, e.g.,
McCormick, "Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Ad-
missibility," 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879
(1982)), many jurisdictions continue
to require (albeit unevenly) the ad-
ditional foundation requirements set
down 64 years ago in Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923):
Just when a scientific principle or
discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and de-
monstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twi-
light zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized,
and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimo-
ny deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it be-
longs.
While commentators have ar-
gued that Frye is well past the age
of retirement (see generally Sym-
posium on Science and the Rules of
Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187-234 (1983)),
and a number of federal circuits and
states have rejected Frye (cases are
listed in Giannelli and Imwinkelried,
Scientific Evidence 14 n.56 (1986)),
the "general acceptance" test re-
mains strongly in force.
Whatever the doctrinal content of
the test for admissibility, the chief
concerns must be the reliability of
evidence, the degree to which lay
jurors can comprehend both the
applications and the limitations of
the evidence, and the availability to
the accused of adequate means by
which to counter an opponent's
presentation. See remarks of Profes-
(Continued on page 44)
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sor Stephen A. Saltzburg in Sym-
posium, supra, 99 F.R.D. 208-18.
The standards for admissibility
contemplate the need for properly
qualified expert witnesses to pro-
vide three basic types of informa-
tion. First, unless the theory,
principle or testing instrument has
in past cases been established
through judicial notice or accep-
tance, the proponent must present
the testimony of a witness who is
qualified to "teach" the judge and
jury about the basic scientific prem-
ises that support the particular ap-
plication at issue. Second, it must be
shown that the tests were properly
conducted and that the instrumen-
tation or other materials used in
making the test were in good work-
ing order or otherwise reliable.
Third, the results of the tests must
be interpreted competently and
communicated to the trier of fact.
Giannelli and lmwinkelried, supra at
1-47.
While it is possible that all three
of these foundational requirements
may be accomplished through a
single witness, when relatively
"novel" evidence is presented at
least two witnesses will be required.
The technician who conducted the
test will be familiar with the me-
chanics of the procedure, but may
not have the foggiest notion of the
scientific theory upon which the
procedure is based or of how the
testing instrumentation is designed
to provide the results. Likewise, the
academic witness is unlikely to have
conducted the tests personally.
A constitutional limitation upon
overly restrictive applications of ev-
identiary standards that inhibit a de-
fendant's right to present scientific
evidence in her own defense may
have been signaled in Rock v. Ar-
kansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). In
Rock the state courts applied a per
se rule excluding all hypnotically re-
freshed testimony and drastically
restricted the defendant's trial tes-
timony to the facts contained in her
recorded pre-hypnosis statement.
The Supreme Court held this appli-
cation of the state rules of evidence
to violate the accused's right to tes-
tify in her own behalf. The Court lo-
cated this right in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and
as a corollary to the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of a right to si-
lence.
While the holding in Rock is quite
narrow, and may be limited to re-
strictions upon a defendant's right
to testify, the Court relied, in part,
upon cases that recognize a defen-
dant's right to present witnesses in
his own behalf, Washington v. Tex-
as, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and
upon the rationale that the state's
general and legitimate concern with
precluding untrustworthy evidence
must be balanced against the right
of the accused to present a defense.
This same reasoning can be applied
when Frye is used to ban whole cat-
egories of forensic evidence on the
basis of an accused's inability to es-
tablish "general acceptance" within
some arbitrarily defined scientific
community. "A state's legitimate in-
terest in barring unreliable evidence
does not extend to per se exclusions
that may be reliable in an individual
case." 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
Discovery
Take maximum advantage of dis-
covery procedures and pretrial mo-
tions to interdict the use of "bad"
science and to prepare for cross-ex-
amination and the presentation of
evidence at trial. Accurate identifi-
cation and thorough evaluation of
scientific issues are essential aspects
of pretrial preparation. Most juris-
dictions permit pretrial discovery by
defendants of scientific reports and
the results of tests conducted on
behalf of the government. Defense
counsel should be aware that re-
quests for these materials may trig-
ger a reciprocal obligation to provide
information concerning defense
conducted tests. The discovery op-
tions in all United States jurisdic-
tions are summarized in Moenssens,
Inbau and Starrs, supra at 23-53 (in-
cluding a suggested motion form).
Although the final reports of the
government's forensic specialists
may identify the kinds of scientific
issues that are likely to arise at trial,
they are not particularly helpful in
determining anything other than the
conclusions reached by the forensic
investigator and, perhaps, the kinds
of testing procedures employed.
Opposing counsel should seek dis-
closure of the lab books, work
sheets and notes of the govern-
ment's experts to evaluate the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the testing
procedures. The defense should
also request copies of the resumes
of the state's experts, including ed-
ucational and training background
and a bibliography of papers, arti-
cles, manuals and books published
by the expert witnesses that the state
intends to present. Effort should also
be made to obtain copies of (or ac-
cess to) the laboratory or other
technical manuals which set out the
methodology, procedures, instru-
mentation, and controls that are to
be used in testing. The failure of the
government's witnesses to follow
the recommended procedures
would, of course, prove useful in
cross-examination.
Some jurisdictions permit depo-
sitions of proposed expert witness-
es and in most states the trial court
will have discretion to order a dep-
osition upon a proper showing of
need. Moenssens, Inbau and Starrs,
supra at 43.
Motions in limine
Having identified questionable
forensic evidence through pretrial
investigation and discovery, coun-
sel may wish to challenge by motion
in limine the admissibility of all or
part of the proposed evidence. Im-
winkelried, Giannelli, Gilligan and
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Lederer, Courtroom Criminal Evi-
dence 32-33 (1987). Not only will
trial courts permit expanded hear-
ings for the development of these
issues when a jury is not waiting in
the wings, a successful motion in
limine will prevent the opponent
from wafting prejudicial material into
the jury box during trial. Another
important function of this pretrial
procedure is to identify precisely the
probative limits of the scientific the-
ories and the opinions of the experts
and thereby keep the testimony
within proper bounds at trial.
For example, microanalysis of the
visible characteristics of hair sam-
ples can either exclude a suspect or
lead to a conclusion that the sus-
pect is within a class of persons that
"could" have been the source of an
unknown hair. Some estimation of
the race of the source may also be
made by a qualified examiner. See
generally Moenssens, Inbau and
Starrs, supra at 467-95. These con-
clusions are highly subjective and
may be influenced by the exam-
iner's knowledge that the "un-
known" hair comes from a known
suspect. Miller, "Procedural Bias in
Forensic Science Examinations of
Human Hair," 11 Law and Hum. Be-
hay. 157 (1987). Some courts have
permitted hair examiners to express
a statistical conclusion that the
probability of finding such a match
from a person picked at random
from a sample population is 1 in
4500. See, e.g., United States ex. rel.
DiGiacomo v. Franzen, 680 F.2d 515
(7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). This es-
timate is based upon a single study,
Gaudette and Keeping, "An At-
tempt at Determining Probabilities
in Human Scalp Hair Comparison,"
19 1. Forensic Sci. 499 (1974), and is
based upon a detailed hair charac-
teristic examination that rarely, if
ever, is replicated in a police foren-
sic laboratory. Moreover, the usual
lab technician witness will not be
able to describe the research meth-
odology employed by the original
researchers, nor will he or she be
able to explain the mathematical
basis for the estimate. Further, the
Gaudette study group of 100 sub-
jects consisted of 92 whites, 2 blacks
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and 6 orientals. Id. at 605. Hence,
the 1 in 4500 statistic has no appli-
cation to non-white suspects. Final-
ly, the Gaudette study has been
criticized for methodological flaws
(Barnett and Ogle, "Probabilities and
Human Hair Comparison," 27 1. Fo-
rensic Sci. 272 (1982)), and is prone
to misuse by prosecutors misstating
the probative value of the statistical
conclusion. Thompson and Schu-
mann, "Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The
Prosecutor's Fallacy and the De-
fense Attorney's Fallacy," 11 Law
and Hum. Behav. 167 (1987); Moen-
nsens, Inbau and Starrs, supra at 487-
95. In any case in which hair com-
parison evidence is expected,
counsel should seek an order in lim-
ine precluding the use of the mis-
leading statistical estimate derived
from the Gaudette study.
Counsel should be aware that a
motion in limine also can be em-
ployed to obtain a preliminary rul-
ing on the admissibility of scientific
evidence that is likely to come un-
der attack at trial. Colbert, "The
Motion in Limine in Politically Sen-
sitive Cases: Silencing the Defen-
dant at Trial," 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1271,
1282-83 (1987). Since hearsay limi-
tations are not applicable to evi-
dence submitted in support of a
ruling on admissibility, the pretrial
offer may be accompanied by tend-
er of relevant affidavits, articles, and
treatises as well as live testimony of
qualified experts. See, e.g., FRE
104(a). For example, if the defense
intends to present an expert witness
to cast doubt upon the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony, a pretrial rul-
ing on the admissibility of that evi-
dence will be of great value in
mapping trial strategy.
Appointment of
defense experts
Much of the advice offered here
applies to those counsel with ade-
quate time and resources for pretri-
al investigation and to hire expert
witnesses. For those counsel in-
volved in indigent defense, how-
ever, the picture is not completely
bleak. The Supreme Court recently
has recognized that a defendant's
access to scientific expertise may be
necessary to assure a fundamentally
fair trial. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68 (1985); see also Caldwell v. Mis-
sissippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1
(1985). In Ake, a capital case, the
Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment entitled an indigent defendant
to access to psychiatric assistance in
the preparation of his defense when
it was shown that the issue of his
sanity at the time of the offense
would be a significant factor at his
trial.
It is clear that Ake and Caldwell
do not require a trial court to pro-
vide expert assistance to an indigent
accused simply because scientific
evidence may be relevant to a de-
fense or will be presented by the
prosecution. As interpreted in Moo-
re v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11 th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 192
(1987), Ake compels a defendant to
demonstrate something more than
a mere possibility of assistance from
an expert. He must show "a reason-
able probability both that an expert
would be of assistance to the de-
fense and that a denial of expert as-
sistance would result in a
fundamentally unfair trial." Id. at
712. The court did note:
An expert can assist a criminal de-
fendant in marshalling his de-
fense in two essential ways. First,
he can gather facts, inspect tan-
gible evidence, or conduct tests
or examinations that may aid de-
fense counsel in confronting the
prosecution's case, including its
expert witnesses, or in fashioning
a theory of defense. Second, the
expert can provide opinion testi-
mony to rebut prosecution evi-
dence or to establish an affirma-
tive defense, such as insanity.
In a given case the assistance of
an expert could be so important to
the defense that without it an in-
nocent defendant could be con-
victed or, at the very least, the
public's confidence in the fairness
of his trial and its outcome could be
undermined. Id. at 709-10.
Moore placed a significant bur-
den on defense counsel to dem-
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onstrate the need for such expert
assistance and suggested that a fail-
ire of counsel to discharge that bur-
den may be the basis for a claim of
ineffectiveness:
[D]efense counsel is obligated to
inform himself about the specific
scientific area in question and to
provide the court with as much
information as possible concern-
ing the usefulness of the request-
ed expert to the defense's case.
Id. at 712.
A lawyer who follows the steps
outlined in this article should be able
to make the kind of showing nec-
essary to demonstrate the need for
access to expert assistance. Even if
a court is still inclined to withhold
authorization for the retention or
appointment of an expert inde-
pendent of the prosecution, it may,
in the interest of justice, at least be
willing to authorize depositions of
the state's experts. See, e.g., Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure; FRE 706(a).
In addition to case specific argu-
ments in support of Ake motions,
trial courts should always be re-
minded of the dismal performance
of crime laboratories reported as a
result of the only systematic profi-
ciency testing program that has been
conducted in this country. Peterson
et al., "Laboratory Testing Research
Program, Final Report of LEAA
Grants 74NI-99-0048 and 76NI-99-
0091," Forensic Sciences Founda-
tion, June 1977 (described in
Moenssens, Inbau and Starrs, supra
at 5-6 n. 10).
Scientists and technicians, like
lawyers and judges, are eminently
fallible. CJ
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